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Abstract—Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) forms a
communication network for the collection of power data from
smart meters in Smart Grid. As the communication within an
AMI needs to be secure, public-key cryptography (PKC) can
be used to reduce the overhead of key management. However,
PKC still has certain challenges in terms of certificate revocation
and management. In particular, distribution and storage of the
Certificate Revocation List (CRL), which holds the revoked
certificates, is a major challenge due to its overhead. To address
this challenge, in this paper, we propose a novel revocation man-
agement approach by utilizing cryptographic accumulators which
reduces the space requirements for revocation information signifi-
cantly and thus enables efficient distribution of such information
to all smart meters. We implemented the proposed approach
on both ns-3 network simulator and an actual AMI testbed
developed at FIU and demonstrated its superior performance
with respect to traditional methods for CRL management.
Index Terms—Advanced Metering Infrastructure, One-way
cryptographic accumulator, Certificate revocation lists, Public
Key Infrastructure
I. INTRODUCTION
THE existing power grid is currently going through amajor transformation to enhance its reliability, resiliency,
and efficiency by enabling networks of intelligent electronic
devices, distributed generators, and dispersed loads [1], which
is referred to as Smart(er) Grid. Advanced Metering Infras-
tructure (AMI) network is one of the renewed components of
Smart Grid that helps to collect smart meter data using a two-
way communication [2]. Smart meters are typically connected
via a wireless mesh network with a gateway (or access point)
serving as a relay between the meters and the utility company.
The security requirements for the AMI network are not
different from the conventional networks as confidentiality,
authentication, message integrity, access control, and non-
repudiation are all needed to secure the AMI. Confidentiality
is required to prevent exposure of customer’s private data to
unauthorized parties while integrity is necessary to ensure that
power readings are not changed for billing fraud. Furthermore,
authentication is crucial to prevent any compromised smart
meters communicating with other smart meters. As in the
case of conventional networks, these requirements can be met
by using either symmetric or asymmetric key cryptography.
However, in both cases, management of the keys is a major
issue in terms of automation, efficiency, and cost. Due to
the huge overhead of maintaining symmetric keys [3], using
public-keys can provide some advantages and makes it easier
to communicate with IP-based outside networks when needed
[4]. Moreover, according to National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is
more appropriate for large AMI depending on the number of
possible communicating pairs of devices [5]. As an example,
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companies such as Landis&Gyr and Silver Spring Networks
use PKI to provide security for millions of smart meters in
the US [6]. In such a PKI, the public-keys for smart meters
and utilities are stored in certificates which are issued by
Certificate Authorities (CAs). The employment of certificates
in AMI requires management of them which include the
creation, renewal, distribution and revocation. In particular,
the certificate revocation and its association with smart meters
are critical and have the potential to impact the performance
of AMI applications significantly [7]. Therefore, we focus on
efficient handling of this issue in this paper.
To recap, there are several reasons that necessitate revoking
certificates, such as key compromise, certificate compromise,
excluding malicious meters, renewing devices, etc. As a result,
when processing certificates, one has to check a certificate’s
revocation status before accepting it. The Certificate Revoca-
tion List (CRL) is a commonly used method for certificate
revocation scheme that keeps the list of revoked certificates
serial numbers and revocation dates. The status of a certificate
can be determined by checking whether it is in the CRL or not.
Considering the large number of smart meters in an AMI and
the fact that the expiration period of a certificate is relatively
longer (and even lifelong in particular applications [6]) than
that of other conventional systems such as websites [8], the
CRL size will grow significantly as time passes. Besides, there
are several known incidents that suddenly cause revocation
of so many certificates. For instance, a recent discovery of
a chip deficiency on RSA key generation caused revocation
of more than 700K certificates of devices which deployed this
specific chip [9] and renowned heartbleed vulnerability caused
the revocation of millions of certificates, immediately [10].
The above cases indicate that independent of the aforemen-
tioned revocation reasons, if there is a new vulnerability in the
used algorithms for certificates, a massive number of revoca-
tions may additionally occur. Thus, dealing with the overhead
of CRLs become a burden both for the resource-constrained
smart meters in terms of storage and for the AMI infrastructure
which is typically restricted in terms of bandwidth to distribute
these CRLs. The latter is particularly critical since reliability
and efficiency of AMI data communication is crucial in the
functioning of the distribution systems in power grid.
In this paper, we propose a communication-efficient revoca-
tion or CRL mananegment scheme for AMI networks by using
RSA accumulators [11]. RSA accumulator is a cryptographic
tool which is able to represent a set of values with a single
accumulator value (i.e., digest a set into a single value). More-
over, it provides a mechanism to check whether an element
is in the set or not which implicitly means that cryptographic
accumulators can be used for efficient membership testing.
Due to the attractiveness of size, in this paper, we adapt
RSA accumulators for our needs by introducing several novel
elements. Specifically, an accumulator manager within the
utility company (UC) is tasked with collection of CRLs from
CAs and accumulating these CRLs (i.e., revoked certificates’
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serial numbers) to a single accumulator value which will then
be distributed to the smart meters. Along with the accumulator
value, we also introduce and distribute a customized non-
revoked proof for allowing a smart meter to check whether
another meter’s certificate is revoked without a need to refer
to the CRL file.
The computation and communication related aspects of
the proposed approach is assessed via simulations in ns3
network. In addition, we built an actual testbed at FIU using
in-house smart meters to assess the performance realistically.
We compared our approach with the other methods that use
conventional CRL schemes and Bloom-filters [12]. The results
show that the proposed approach significantly outperforms the
other existing methods in terms of reducing the communi-
cation overhead that is measured with the completion time.
The overhead in terms of computation is not major and can
be handled in advance within the utility that will not impact
the smart meters. This paper is organized as follows: In the
next two sections, we summarize the related work and the
background. Section IV introduces the threat model. Section
V present the proposed approach with its features. Section
V and VI is dedicated to security analysis and experimental
validation. The paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
A. CRL Management in AMIs
The studies [7], [13] investigated different revocation man-
agement aspects such as aspects such as short-lived-certificate
scheme, tamper-proof device scheme, Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP), conventional CRL, and compressed CRL
for AMI. However, these studies just state the importance
of revocation management for AMI and provide a general
overview. To summarize the basics, in the OCSP approach
[14], an online and interactive OCSP server stores revocation
information and responds to the queries to check the status of
a certificate. An improved version of this approach is called
OCSP ”stapling” [15] where the smart meters query the OCSP
server at certain intervals and obtains a timestamped OCSP
response which is directly signed by the CA. This response
is included (i.e., stapled) in the certificate as a proof that
it is not revoked. Even though the OCSP approaches can
be advantageous by not requiring distribution and storage of
revocation information on smart meters, deploying them in
an AMI environment is not attractive since this will require
frequent access to a remote server which will create enormous
traffic from all smart meters that may disrupt other AMI
services. Furthermore, it violates a common habit where AMIs
are maintained as isolated networks by allowing access from
smart meters to CAs.
The first comprehensive study that focused on reducing
the revocation management overhead for AMI was based on
Bloom Filters [16]. The size of CRLs was reduced by Bloom
Filters. However, Bloom Filters suffer from false positives and
may eventually require accessing the CA to check the validity
of a certificate. Our proposed scheme, on the other hand,
never requires accessing a remote server and provide a better
reduction on CRL size. The study in [17] used distributed hash
tables (DHT) to reduce the CRL size. Although this study
provides a reduction in CRL size, it suffers from additional
inter-meter communication overhead for accessing the CRL
information.
We would like to note that a very preliminary version of
this work was published in [18]. This work, however, contains
at least 60% additional material and most of the previous
material has been changed significantly. First, we improved
the proposed approach by utilizing Eulers Theorem for an
improved computational performance. Second, we extended
our threat model to new attack types that were not considered
in the conference version. In this regard, we changed our
approach in several ways: We proposed to use an initial secret
during accumulation. We then introduced a non-revoked proof
concept that was not used before in any of the revocation
works. This required major changes to the accumulation pro-
cess which was not in [18]. We finally proposed an extensive
certificate verification protocol as countermeasures to the new
threats. This also required proposing a new secure multi-level
AMI architecture as opposed to the monolithic architecture
used in [18]. The experiments are also completely changed:
We built an AMI testbed utilizing IEEE 802.11s-based mesh
network protocol to conduct more realistic tests. The con-
ference version had only simulation results. In addition, we
added several new experiments with accumulator computation
overhead under various assumptions.
B. Cryptographic Accumulators
Cryptographic accumulators were first introduced by Be-
nalog and DeMare [19]. After their first appearance, there
have been studies [11], [20], [21] offering to use them for
membership testing. However, these studies solely focused
on building the cryptographic fundamentals of accumulators,
and thus, omit application specific issues and security features
when deploying them. In addition, these studies are offering
to use accumulators for membership testing by accumulating
a valid list. Considering AMI, accumulation of valid smart
meter’s certificates to provide a revocation mechanism would
constitute a significant overhead due to the fact that revocation
frequency is less than that of creating new certificates (i.e., no
need to update the accumulator each time when a new smart
meter is added to AMI) and number of revoked certificates
is also less than the number of valid certificates which affects
the required computation time significantly [10]. Our approach
mitigates these drawbacks by addressing security and applica-
tion specific issues and offering to use CRLs instead of valid
certificates.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Background on Cryptographic Accumulators
Benaloh and De Mare [19] introduced the cryptographic
accumulator concept which is a one-way hash function with
a special property of being quasi-commutative. A quasi-
commutative function is a special function F such that
y0, y1, y2 ∈ Y :
F(F(y0, y1), y2) = F(F(y0, y2), y1) (1)
The properties of this function can be summarized as follows:
1) it is a one-way function, i.e., hard to invert; 2) it is a hash
function for obtaining a secure digest A (i.e., accumulator
value) where A = F(F(F(y0, y1), y2), ..., ym) for a set of
values {y0, y1, y2, ..., ym} ∈ Y; 3) it is a quasi-commutative
hash function which is different from other well-known hash
functions such that the accumulator value A does not depend
on the order of yi accumulations.
These properties allow cryptographic accumulators to be
used for a condensed representation of a set of elements.
In addition, since the resulting accumulated hashes of yi
(Y = {yi; 0 < i < m}) stays the same even if the order
of hashing is changed, it can be used for efficient membership
testing by using a special value called witness value wi. For
instance, the witness wj of corresponding yj is calculated by
accumulating all yi except the case where i 6= j (e.g., wj =
F(F(F(y0, y1), ..., yj−1, yj+1..., ym)). Then, when necessary
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any of the members can check whether yj is also a member of
the group by just verifying whether F(wj , yj) = A. Note that,
because F is a one-way function, it would be computationally
infeasible to obtain wj from yj and A. However, there is
a risk for collusion in this scheme when an adversary can
come up with wj
′
and yj
′
pairs where yj
′
/∈ Y to obtain the
same accumulator value: F(wj ′ , yj ′) = A. In the literature,
there is already a cyrptographic accumulator, namely the
RSA construction [22] which guarantees that finding such
pairs is computationally hard by restricting the inputs to the
accumulator function to be prime numbers only. This scheme
is known as collision-free accumulator that enables secure
membership testing (i.e., without any collision). Therefore, in
this paper, we chose to employ RSA construction which is
elaborated next.
B. RSA Accumulator
RSA accumulator [22] has a RSA modulus N = pq, where
p and q are strong primes. The RSA accumulation value A
is calculated on consecutive modular exponentiation of prime
numbers set Y = {y1, ..., yn} and g is quadratic residue of N
as follows: A = gy1,...,yn (mod N ) (2)
The witness wi of corresponding yi is calculated by accumu-
lating all values except yi:
wi = g
y1,...,yi−1,yi+1,...,yn (mod N ) (3)
Then, the membership testing can be done via a simple expo-
nential operation by comparing the result with the accumulator
value A:
wyii ↔ A (4)
The described accumulator scheme so far basically allows
generation of a “witnesses” to prove that an item is in the
set. A more advanced accumulator would offer proofs of non-
membership which proves that an item is NOT in the set [23].
For this scheme, let us assume any x /∈ Y = {y1, ..., yn}. In
a nutshell, the non-witness values can be computed by the
following steps: Let u denote
∏n
i=1 yi, the scheme finds non-
witness nw1, b value pairs of x by solving the equation of
nw1×u+ b×x = 1 using the Extended Euclidean algorithm.
Then, the scheme computes a value nw2 such that:
nw2 = g
−b (mod N ) (5)
After these steps, the non-membership testing can be done
via a simple exponential operation by checking whether the
following equation holds:
Anw1 ↔ nw2x × g (mod N ) (6)
Besides, if a new value y
′
is added to list, the accumulator
value is updated by using the previous accumulator value A:
A′ = Ay
′
(mod N ) (7)
C. Certificate, CRL and Delta CRLs
As we deal with certificates, we would like to also provide
some basic background on certificates and their management.
Certificates are issued by a CA with a planned lifetime to
an expiration date and have unique serial numbers. Once
issued, these certificates are valid until their expiration date.
However, there are various reasons that cause a certificate to
be revoked before the expiration date. These reasons include
but not limited to compromise of the corresponding private
key, changing the underlying device infrastructure, etc.
Revocation causes each CA regularly issued a signed list
called a CRL which is a time-stamped list consisting of serial
numbers of revoked certificates and revocation dates. When
a PKI-enabled system uses a certificate (for example, for
verifying the integrity of a message), that system should not
only check the time validity of the certificate, but an additional
check is required to determine a certificate’s revocation status
during the integrity check. To do so, CRL can be checked to
determine the status of the certificate.
There are two main types of CRL: full CRLs and delta
CRLs. A full CRL contains the status of all revoked certificates
which are not expired yet. Delta CRLs, which is a concept
defined in in RFC 5280 [24], contain only the status of newly
revoked certificates that have been revoked after the issuance
of the last full CRL and before the new release of it. Therefore,
a full CRL is issued for a limited time frame and should
be updated regularly. Until next update time, delta CRLs
help keeping track of the newly revoked certificates. When
delta CRLs are enabled, the CA can distribute full CRLs at
longer intervals (for reducing distribution overhead) and delta
CRLs at shorter intervals. An important point about delta CRL
concept is that it does not eliminate the requirement of full
CRL distribution. The full CRL must still be re-distributed
when the previous full CRL expires since CRL has also a
lifetime period as certificates and the lifetime period of delta
CRLs are dependent on the lifetime of the previous full CRL.
This means both the full CRL and delta CRL should be updated
regularly by all the potential nodes that will be using them.
In the case of AMI, these CRLs may contain thousand of
revoked certificate IDs due to longer expiration dates of issued
certificates (even lifelong [6]) and need to be distributed to the
each smart meters which will cause a huge overhead due to
their size as will be shown in the experiments.
IV. THREAT MODEL
The security of the proposed approach depends on the
secure implementation of the revocation management system.
Therefore, we considered the following threats to the pro-
posed approach. 1 Compromised certificate attack: In an
attacker’s perspective, the meter/gateway is the entry point to
the AMI. The attacker can use a compromised certificate to
force a malicious smart meter to connect to the AMI network
or impersonate the gateway to apply various attacks. 2
Compromising the accumulator manager: Compromising
the accumulator manager that performs accumulator opera-
tions could threaten all revocation management. This threat is
similar to compromising a CA which requires a new set up
from scratch by renewing all accumulator values. 3 Accumu-
lator freshness attack: If an attacker obtains the accumulator
value A and combines it with the public knowledge of CRL
information, he/she can quickly determine which certificates
are accumulated in the list. It might lead to deducing the
freshness of the accumulator value. As a result, the attacker
can perform a chosen attack by using a compromised device
which has not been accumulated yet. 4 Stolen non-witness
attack: The security of accumulator approach depends on
the security of witness/non-witness values. If those values are
stolen, an attacker can use those values to authenticate itself
to AMI.
V. PROPOSED APPROACH
A. Overview
The proposed approach basically eliminates the need to
store and distribute CRLs when the devices communicate in a
secure manner. Instead of keeping a CRL file for verification of
revocation status of certificates, our approach dictates to store
at each device (e.g., smart meter, gateway, HES, etc.) only an
accumulator value and a proof which proves the validity of the
device’s certificate. The accumulator value and proof can be
computed at the utility company and distributed to devices in
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advance. Any updates regarding revoked certificates trigger re-
computation of these values. Keeping just two integer values
for revocation management brings a lot of efficiency in terms
of storage and distribution overhead as will be shown in the
Experiments section. In the next subsections, we will explain
the details of our approach.
B. Adaptation of RSA Accumulator for Our Case
We propose several modifications to the existing RSA
Accumulator so that it can be employed in our settings as
listed below.
1) Integration of CRL and non-witness Concept: In the
traditional CRL approach, when a smart meter presents its
certificate to the recipient meter, that meter needs to verify
that the presented certificate is NOT in the CRL. To be able
to employ the accumulator approach, we generate non-witness
values for the presenter to prove that it is not in the list.
We accumulate the revocation information (stored in CRLs)
into a single accumulator value and produce non-membership
witnesses for the non-revoked smart meters.
2) Reducing the Complexity of Accumulator Computation:
While computing the accumulator value using Eq. 2, the
exponent needs to be computed as
∏n
i=1 yi before doing the
modular exponentiation. This becomes infeasible when the
size of Y increases since u =
∏n
i=1 yi will be n× k bits as-
suming each yi is a k-bit integer. In our approach, we decided
to use Euler’s Theorem [25] to cope with this complexity. With
access to the totient of N (i.e., φ(N )), the exponent of g in
accumulation computation will be u
′
=
∏n
i=1 yi mod φ(N ).
Thus, with the knowledge of the totient, it becomes more
efficient to compute the required values via reducing the u
by φ(N ).
3) Generating Prime Inputs for the Accumulator: For ac-
cumulation, we can use the certificate IDs (cid) which are
generated by the CAs. However, to ensure a collision-free
accumulator, we need to use only prime numbers as dictated
by the RSA accumulator. Since CRLs contain arbitrary serial
numbers for certificate IDs, it is necessary to compute a
prime representative for each certificate ID as an input to the
RSA accumulator. Thus, we used the random oracle based
prime generator described in [22] for prime representatives
generation from the serial numbers. The scheme basically
has a random oracle Ω() function which produces a random
number r for an input cid. We use Ω() to find a 256-bit
number, d, which causes the result of the following equation
to be a prime number:
y = 2256 × Ω(cid) + d (8)
By solving this equation, we generate a prime representative
y for a revoked certificate. The reader is referred to [22] for
security proof details of the method.
4) Functions of Revocation Management: After preparing
the inputs, we compiled and modified the offered accumulator
structure and proposed the following functions to construct
revocation management for AMI. Our RSA accumulator uses
the following input sets: Y is the set of prime representatives
of revoked certificates’ serial numbers and X is set of prime
representative of valid certificates’ serial numbers where x ∈
X :
• auxinfo,N ← Setup(k): This function is to setup the
parameters of the accumulator. It takes k as an input
which represents the length of the RSA modulus in bits
(e.g., 2048, 4096, etc.) and generates modulus N along
with auxinfo which is basically Euler’s totient φ(N ).
• A ← ComputeAcc(Y, rk, auxinfo): This is the actual
function which accumulates revocation information by
taking prime representatives of serial numbers set Y.
While computing the accumulator value, we propose to
use an initial random secret prime number rk as a first
exponent (grk ) in Eq. 2.
• nrproof ← ComputeNonRevokedProof(auxinfo,Y, x):
This function first computes a pair of non-witness values
represented as (nw1, nw2) for a valid certificate whose
prime representative is x. Then, the UC concatenates the
non-witness value pair with x and the serial number of
the certificate creating a 4-tuple called nrproof .
• 0, 1 ← RevocationCheck(A, nrproof ): When a smart
meter which has a prime representative x wants to
authenticate itself to another party, the other one uses
nrproof and A to verify that x is not in the accumulated
revocation list by checking Eq. 6.
• At ← UpdateAcc(At−1,Yt): This function is for up-
dating the accumulator value A when the revocation
information is updated via deltaCRLs. It takes a set of
prime representatives of corresponding newly revoked
certificates Yt and latest accumulator value At−1, and
returns the new accumulator value At by utilizing Eq. 7.
• nrproof t ← UpdateNonRevokedProof(At,Yt, x):
This function is for updating the non-revoked proof of
corresponding valid smart meters when the revocation
information is updated via deltaCRLs. It takes a set of
prime representatives of corresponding newly revoked
certificates Yt, the updated accumulator value At, and
the prime representative x and returns non-revoked proof
nrproof
t of smart meter after some additional certificates
are revoked by utilizing the process for Eq. 5.
Next, we define the components of the proposed framework.
C. Components of Revocation Management System
We propose the system architecture shown in Figure 1 to
enable the proposed revocation management and to define its
interaction with the deployed AMI components. In addition,
the newly introduced components of this architecture and their
roles in executing the above defined functions are described
below:
Fig. 1. The structure of proposed revocation management.
• Smart Meters and Gateway: The smart meters and gate-
way can directly communicate with each other and with
Head-end System (HES) over LTE. Thus, to ensure the
security of applications, these devices need to run the
RevocationCheck() function and carry the latest A and
the corresponding nrproof .
• Head-End System: HES is an interface between the utility
operations center and smart meters, and it is located in a
demilitarized zone (DMZ). The primary function of the
HES is collecting the power data from smart meters and
transfer them to head-end management servers (HMS).
Since it has two-way communication with smart meters, it
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needs to run the RevocationCheck() function and carry
the latest A and its nrproof .
• CRL Collector: The CRL collector plays one of the key
roles in our revocation management system. It basically
collects CRLs from various CAs and feeds them to the
Accumulator Manager. Since it has an open interface to
the outside network (communicating with other CAs), it
is placed in DMZ area.
• Accumulator Manager: Accumulator Manager is the core
of our revocation management scheme. It gets CRL
information from the CRL Collector and accumulates
them to obtain latest accumulator value. It implements
the Setup(), ComputeAcc(), ComputeNonRevokedProof(),
UpdateAcc(), and UpdateNonRevokedProof() functions.
Whenever a new accumulator value is calculated at a
time t, it sends the accumulator value At and updated
nrproof
t to the HMS which then forwards them to HES
for distributing to the smart meters.
• Head End Management Server: The collected data is
managed within HMS. It basically monitors activity logs,
identifies new devices and manages incident response
processes. As mentioned, the HMS collects the newly
generated A and nrproof values and sends them to HES
for distribution.
D. Revocation and Certificate Verification Processes
In this section, we describe the proposed revocation scheme
and the protocol for certificate verification.
1) Accumulating the CRL: This process includes two
phases namely the setup phase and the update phase which
are described below.
• The setup phase: In this phase of our approach, the Ac-
cumulator Manager in the UC basically accumulates the
revoked certificate IDs in full CRLs. This process works
as follows: The full CRL files are read, and each certificate
ID and its issuer’s public key are concatenated to obtain a
unique string that will be input to the accumulator. Note
that the issuer’s public key is concatenated on purpose to
eliminate any duplicates in serial numbers that may come
from different CAs. Then, the Accumulator Manager
calculates prime representatives for each concatenated
string and accumulates these prime representatives to
obtain the accumulator value. Finally, the Accumulator
Manager generates non-revoked proofs (i.e., the 4-tuple
nrproof ) for each end-device (smart meter, gateway, HES,
etc.) by using ComputeNonRevokedProof() function.
• The update phase: This phase is for revocation informa-
tion updates that can be done through delta CRLs. Due
to such updates, the accumulator value A and nrproof
values should be updated. To update these values, the
Accumulator Manager first prepares the prime represen-
tatives for the newly revoked certificates (i.e., the ones
that are included in the delta CRLs) by following the
same approach in the setup phase. It then updates the
previously computed accumulator value, At−1, by using
the UpdateAcc() function to obtain At which is then
used to generate new nrproof tuples for the end devices
by using the UpdateNonRevokedProof() function.
2) Certificate Verification Protocol: When two meters com-
municate by sending/receiving signed messages, the signatures
in these messages need to be verified. To be able to start
the verification process, a receiving device needs to use
the public key (for signature verification) presented in the
certificate sent to itself. To ensure that this certificate is not
revoked, then it needs to initiate a process which we call as
Fig. 2. Certificate Verification Protocol Scheme.
certificate verification protocol. Figure 2 shows an overview
of this process. Basically, the receiving device checks the
corresponding nrproof tuple’s signature to ensure that it is
produced by the UC. Once the signature is verified, it then
checks whether the the serial number within the tuple is same
as the serial number of the provided certificate (i.e., either
EndDevice#1.cer). For additional security, it also checks the
length of the nw1&nw2 to see whether it is equal to the
first accumulation setup parameter k. Finally, by performing
RevocationCheck() function, it checks whether the provided
nrproof is correct. If all these steps are successful, the end-
device has successfully complete the certificate verification
protocol. Note that, without carrying the nrproof , a smart
meter can not be authenticated even if it has a valid certificate.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our proposed approach addresses all the threats mentioned
in Section IV. 1 Compromised certificate attack: The pro-
posed scheme is robust to this type of attack since any revoked
certificate in CRL will be transferred to the smart meters
through nrproof and A values. This will prevent authentica-
tion of any revoked devices to the AMI. 2 Compromising
the accumulator manager: First, through the architectural
design in Figure 1 the core of our revocation mechanism
(i.e., accumulator manager) is protected from any attacks
by not allowing a direct communication from outside of the
network through two different firewalls. Second, our scheme is
also allowing computation of nrproof without keeping critical
security parameters of RSA accumulator settings RSA (i.e.,
auxinfo and p&q), since auxiliary data enables a malicious
actor to prove arbitrary statements. These parameters can be
deleted once they are used initially. In such a case, the compu-
tation of nrproof can still be accomplished, but it may be more
computationally intensive as will be shown in the Experiments
Section. 3 Accumulator freshness attack: While computing
the accumulator value, we use a secret prime number rk as a
first exponent (grk ) in Eq. 2. This prevents an adversary from
making a guess about accumulated serial numbers. 4 Stolen
non-witness attack: Even if the corresponding non-witness
value nw of a smart meter is exposed, the authentication
will fail while checking the signatures of the message by the
proposed certificate verification protocol in Fig.2.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Experimental Setup
To assess the performance of the proposed approach, we
implemented it in C++ by using FLINT [26], which is the
fastest library for number theory and modular arithmetic op-
erations over large integers. For the RSA modulus generation
and prime representatives computation, we used Crypto++
library since it allows thread-safe operations. We prepared
a binary-encoded full CRL and delta CRL that have been
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digitally signed according to RFC 5280 standard and contained
30,000 and 1000 revoked certificates for full CRL and delta
CRL respectively. The full CRL was used to compute A and
nrproof tuples during the setup phase while the delta CRL ws
used for updating both A and nrproof tuples.
For communication overhead assessment, we used the well-
known ns-3 simulator [27] which has a built-in implementation
of IEEE 802.11s mesh network standard. The underlying MAC
protocol used was 802.11g. We created two different AMI
grid topologies that consist of 81 and 196 smart meters. Even
though the number of smart meters in our simulation setup is
less than a real AMI setup, it still represents a practical setup in
terms of the number of hops due to limited transmission range
of 802.11g which leads to multiple hops to reach a smart meter
from the gateway (e.g., for 81 nodes the average hop count is
6 and for 196 setup average hop count is 9). In a typical AMI
setup in the wild, utilities are able to use 900MHz frequency
bands [28] which helps to reach thousand of smart meters
through a few hops due to the extended transmission range.
Unfortunately, ns-3 does not support those frequencies to build
a mesh network, and thus we created a simulation environment
which reflects similar number of hops as in the wild.
(a) Smart meter (b) Testbed topology
Fig. 3. AMI Testbed
Finally, for more realistic results, we built an IEEE 802.11s-
based mesh network comprised of 18 Protronix Wi-Fi dongles
attached to Raspberry-PIs which are integrated with the in-
house meters as shown in Fig. 3a. While building the testbed
on the third floor in the Engineering Center of FIU, we
carefully dispersed the meters on the floor as shown in Fig.
3b. To obtain the shown multi-hop routing structure among
meters, we decreased the Tx-Power up to by a factor of 16 to
limit their transmission range [29]. By such positioning and
decreased Tx-Power, we strive to mimic realistic conditions
that reflect multi-hop routing in a real AMI setup.
B. Baselines and Performance Metrics
We investigated the communication and computation over-
head of our approach by using the following metrics:
• Completion Time: This metric is defined for commu-
nication overhead assessment, which indicates the total
elapsed time to complete the distribution of accumula-
tor value and non-revoked proofs to the smart meters
from the HES. This metric hints on the communication
overhead of revocation management in terms of assessing
how it keeps the communication channels busy which are
critical for carrying other information.
• Computation Time: This is the metric to measure the total
time for completing the required computations such as
computation of accumulator value, prime representatives,
and revocation check time, etc.
• Storage: This metrics indicates the amount of space for
storing the CRL information in the meters.
For comparison to our approach, we used two other baselines
from the literature:
• Traditional CRL Method: Each smart meter keeps the
whole CRL [13] locally which is distributed by the UC.
• Bloom Filter Method: A Bloom filter [12] is used to store
revoked certificates information. Note that, we employed
murmur hash function, which is a non-cryptographic hash
function suitable for fast hash-based lookup, to build this
Bloom filter. In this case, the Bloom Filter is distributed
to each meter by the UC.
C. Communication Overhead
As the main objective of our work was to improve the effi-
ciency of the distribution of the CRLs, we first conducted the
communication related experiments to assess the performance
of our approach.
1) CRL Distribution Overhead: In this subsection, we
report on the completion time for the CRL distribution of our
approach with respect to other baselines both in simulation
and testbed environments. The results which are shown in
Fig. 4 indicate the accumulator approach significantly reduces
the completion time compared to local CRL and bloom filter
approaches due to condense accumulating. Even with respect
to Bloom filter, which is touted as one of the most efficient
methods in the literature, our approach reduced the completion
time in approximately more than 10 orders of magnitude.
Another critical observation from the simulation results
is the scalability capabilities of our approach. While es-
pecially for the local CRL approach, the completion time
increases significantly, this is not the case for our approach.
Fig. 4. CRL distribution overhead
This can be
attributed to the
fact that the
accumulator value
is independent
of the revoked
CRL size while
the overhead of
other methods
is proportional
to the CRL size.
The main overhead of our approach is directly related to
the accumulator setting which was 2048 bits in our case.
Therefore, even for very large-scale deployments that can
have millions of meters, the overhead will not be impacted. In
analyzing the experiments results for the testbed, we observe
that the completion time takes more time even though
the network size is much smaller. This is mainly because
of the signal propagation issues such as path attenuation,
refraction, interference from other devices, etc. within the
building which does not exist in ns-3 simulations. Such
issues cause more errors and packet loss and thus increase
the re-transmissions to complete all packet distributions. In
fact, the AMI infrastructure might have a similar challenge
depending on the geographical location (e.g., urban vs rural
environments) and thus the distribution of CRL will become
even more critical. Therefore, our approach will be more
suitable for such environments to reduce the impact from the
wild.
2) CRL Update Overhead: In this subsection, we con-
ducted experiments to assess the overhead of CRL up-
dates assuming that such updates are done regularly us-
ing the delta CRL concept. Fig. 5 shows revocation up-
date overhead in terms of the completion time. As in
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the case of full CRL, our approach significantly out-
performs others due to of the size of the delta CRL.
Fig. 5. CRL update overhead
However, the
results for the
Bloom filter
approach shows a
different trend this
time. It performs
worse than
the local CRL
approach. This
can be explained
as follows: For
each updated revocation information, the Bloom filters must
be created from scratch to carry both previous and newly
revoked certificates. As a result, updating the CRL will
take slightly more time than the whole CRL distribution for
Bloom filter and thus will take more time than the local
CRL approach. Note that the overhead of CRL distribution
is proportional to the size of the delta CRL and thus the
completion time follows a similar trend with the results in
Fig. 4.
For the testbed results, we observe a similar which consis-
tent with the simulations. Again, the completion time is more
due to signal propagation and interference issues.
D. Computation Overhead
We have demonstrated in the previous subsection that our
approach significantly reduces the communication overhead.
But, we need to also assess whether such a reduction in-
troduces any major computational overhead. Thus, in this
subsection, we investigated a detailed computational overhead
of our approach. Specifically, we conducted two types of
experiments: 1) We assessed the overhead of the computations
due to the accumulation process in the Accumulator Manager.
These experiments were conducted on a computer which has
64-bit 2.2GHz CPU with 10 hardware cores, and 32 GB of
RAM assuming that these are reasonable assumptions for the
computer that will act as the Accumulator Manager. Moreover,
we also investigated whether some of these computations
can be parallelized to further reduce the computation times
through multi-thread implementations; and 2) We assessed
the computation time for the RevocationCheck() function
in meters by implementing it in a Raspberry Pi (smart meter).
1) Overhead Results for the Accumulator Manager: In
this subsection, we present and discuss the overhead at the
Accumulator Manager by considering the functions below:
Computing Prime Representatives: To assess the com-
putational overhead of prime representative generation,
Fig. 6. Prime representative computation
we computed
prime
representatives
for different set
sizes. Note that
since both the
valid and revoked
certificates serial
numbers are used
in our approach,
the input size
can become huge
when AMI scales. Therefore, we also conducted a benchmark
test by using threads to show the parallelization ability of our
approach. The results are shown in Fig. 6. As can be seen,
the computational complexity of the prime representative
generation is not overwhelming. 105 representatives can
be computed nearly in 1 minute even using a single core.
Parallelization reduces the computational complexity by
roughly 10 folds which allows computational times in the
order of seconds.
Computing the Accumulator Value: Next, we benchmark the
computation cost of accumulator value according to different
CRL sizes as used in the previous experiment. In addition,
we also conducted tests to assess the computational difference
between our setting (i.e., the Accumulator Manager has all
auxinfo information) and the case where the Accumulator
Manager does not have auxinfo as discussed in Section IV.C.
Fig. 7. Accumulator computation
Note that for the
computation of
the accumulator
value, a parallel
implementation
was not possible
since each step in
the computation
depends on
the previous
operation. As
seen in Fig. 7,
the accumulator value is calculated under a minute for 105
revoked certificates even without using auxinfo. However, the
availability of auxinfo significantly reduces the computation
time making it possible to finish it milliseconds regardless of
the size of the CRL.
Computing Non-Revoked Values: Finally, we assessed
the overhead of the computation of non-revoked proofs
for both the first setup phase by using full CRL and
the update phase by using delta CRL. Again, we con-
ducted tests based on the availability/lack of auxinfo and
parallelization ability.Fig. 8 shows the computation over-
head of this function according to different AMI sizes. As
seen, auxinfo makes a significant difference in this case.
Fig. 8. nrproof computation for full CRL
Even with
parallelization,
the computational
times are still in
the order of days
which may not be
acceptable in an
AMI setting. The
results indicate
that auxinfo
needs to be
available for
efficient computations. We repeated the same experiment for
the UpdateNonRevokedProof() function and observed the
same trends since the only change was the size of the CRL
(i.e., delta CRL is much smaller). These results were not
shown due to space constraints.
2) Overhead Results for Revocation Check: Finally, we
looked at the computational time overhead for checking
whether a certificate is revoked or not based on the three
approaches compared. This is an important experiment to
understand the computation overhead of our approach on the
smart meter, considering the fact that it has limited resources.
As can be seen in Table I, the elapsed time for a single
revocation check is around 10 milliseconds in our approach.
Comparing with the other methods, the Bloom Filter has the
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best results as expected because it enables faster checking
by efficient hash operations. However, Bloom filter suffers
from false-positives which degrades its efficiency by requiring
access to the server [12]. Our approach does not have such
a problem. While our approach doubles the revocation check
time compared to the local CRL method, the time is still pretty
fast as it is in the order of milliseconds which does not impact
any other operation. This is a negligible overhead given that it
brings a considerable space-saving benefit which affects both
distribution and storage overhead.
TABLE I
ELAPSED REVOCATION CHECK TIME
Local
CRL
Bloom
Filter
Accumulator
Approach
Average Time (ms) 4.1 0.06 9.8
E. Storage Overhead
To compare the storage requirements, we identified the
needed revocation information size for our approach and
compared it with the other approaches, as shown in Table II.
As expected, accumulator has a superior advantage since smart
meters just need to store a small accumulator value and non-
revoked proof value. Local CRL, on the other hand, keeps
the whole CRL list and depending on the number of revoked
certificates, it can be huge. For our scenario, the CRL size
is around 0.7MB for 30K revoked certificates. While Bloom
filter’s performance is also promising, it is still not better than
our approach and it suffers from false positives as discussed.
TABLE II
CRL STORAGE OVERHEAD
Local
CRL
Bloom
Filter
Accumulator
Approach
Required Space (MB) 0.690 0.046 0.001
VIII. CONCLUSION
Considering the overhead of certificate and CRL manage-
ment in AMI networks, in this paper, we proposed a one-way
cryptographic accumulator based approach for maintaining
and distributing the revocation information. The framework
condenses the CRLs into a short accumulator value and builds
a secure, efficient and lightweight revocation mechanism in
terms of communication overhead. The approach is inspired
from cryptographic accumulators and adopted based on the
requirements of AMI. The experiment results indicate that the
proposed approach can reduce the distribution completion time
significantly for compared to CRL and Bloom filter approaches
while introducing only minor additional computational over-
head which is handled by the UC. There is no overhead
imposed to smart meters.
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